{SjMl/Awi 


A  COMPREHENSIVE  SKETCH 


- :  OF  : 


OR 


Second  Battle  oe  Bull  Run, 


GIVING  A  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  ONE  OF  THE  MOST  IMPORTANT 
ENGAGEMENTS  OF  THE  LATE  CIVIL  WAR. 


ILLUSTRATED. 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  MANASSAS  PANORAMA  CO., 
Cor.  Fifteenth  Street  and  Ohio  Ave., 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

1886. 


JUDD  &  DETWEILER,  PRINTERS. 


PANORAMA 


OF- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS 


OR 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN, 


By  THEO.  POILPOT, 


AUTHOR  OF 

The  Panorama  of  the  Battle  of  Reischoffen,  Paris. 

“  “  Storming  of  the  Bastile,  Paris. 

“  “  Battle  of  Buzenval,  Paris. 

“  “  Charge  of  Balaclava,  London. 

“  “  Passage  of  the  Danube,  Russia. 

“  “  Battle  of  Shiloh,  Chicago. 

“  “  Merrimac  and  Monitor  Naval  Battle,  N.  Y. 

“  “  Battle  of  Manassas,  or  Second  Battle  of 

Bull  Run,  Washington,  D.  C. 


CO-LABORERS 

all  graduates  of  the  ecole  DES  BEAUX  ARTS,  PARIS. 


Messieurs 

L.  Du  Paty  (Sup’t) 

Messieurs 

C.  H.  Delpy, 

cc 

P.  Carrier-Belleuse 

u 

L.  C.  Bombled 

u 

L.  Ivowalsky, 

U 

F.  Bassot, 

u 

G.  Bellenger, 

u 

F.  de  Launay, 

u 

E.  Merlot, 

u 

G.  Picard, 

u 

N.  Rebersat, 

u 

P.  Ballue, 

A.  Le  Prince  (Manager.) 


Everybody  visiting  New  York  should  not  fail  to  see  Mons.  Poilpot’s  late  produc¬ 
tion,  “  The  Great  Naval  Battle  between  the  Merrimac  and  Monitor  Iron  Clads, 
the  burning  of  the  Congress  and  sinking  of  the  Cumberland  men  of  war.” 

The  entire  Press  of  New  York  have  pronounced  it  the  most  perfect  realism  ever 
produced. 

It  is  on  the  corner  of  Madison  Avenue  and  59th  Street,  and  quickly  reached 
by  Elevated  Road  from  down  town. 

No  one  goes  to  Chicago  without  going  to  see  his  “  Battle  of  Shiloh.” 


THE  BATTLE 


OF 


^T^HIS  famous  battle — called  by  us  the  “  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Bun,”  and  by  the  Con¬ 
federates  the  “Battle  of  Manassas  ” — was  fought  on  the  30th  day  of  August,  1862,  on 
ground  already  rendered  historic  as  the  scene  of  the  first  great  struggle  in  the  civil 
war— the  “First  Battle  of  Bull  Bum,”  July  21st,  1861. 

A  sanguinary  fight  on  the  night  of  the  28th,  and  several  severe  engagements  during  the 
20th,  terminating  with  a  furious  assault  made  on  the  enemy  at  dark  at  Groveton,  were  in 
themselves  battles,  and  although  measured  bv  the  events  of  the  day  to  follow  were  but  com¬ 
bats,  yet  in  a  military  sense  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run. 

Our  forces,  known  as  the  “Army  of  Virginia,”  composed  of  the  previously  independent 
commands  of  Generals  McDowell,  Banks,  and  Fremont,  were  commanded  by  Major  General 
John  Pope;  those  of  the  enemy— the  “Army  of  Northern  Virginia” — were  led  by  General 
Robert  E.  Lee.  Numerically  these  forces  were  quite  evenly  balanced,  the  armies  each  com¬ 
prising  about  55,000  men  of  all  arms. 

General  Pope,  in  accordance  with  orders  from  the  President,  assumed  command  of  the 
“Army  of  \  irginia”  on  the  26th  of  June,  1862.  At  that  time  it  was  composed  of  the  1st 
corps,  Major  General  Franz  Sigel ;  the  2d  corps.  Major  General  N.  P.  Banks;  the  3d  corps, 
Major  General  Irvin  McDowell,  with  33  batteries  of  artillery  and  2  brigades  of  cavalry — 
(those  of  Buford  and  Bayard)  numbering  about  5,000  sabres. 

This  force,  later  on,  was  largely  augmented  by  the  arrival  of  three  corps  of  the  “Army 
of  the  Potomac,”  viz:  The  3d  corps,  Major  General  S.  P.  Heintzelman;  the  5th  corps, 
Major  General  Fitz  John  Porter ;  and  the  9th  corps,  Brigadier  General  J.  L.  Reno,  together 
with  10  batteries  of  artillery,  Major  General  A.  E.  Burnside  remaining  temporarily  at  Fal¬ 
mouth  to  facilitate  the  forwarding  of  troops  and  supplies. 

Among  the  division  and  brigade  commanders  were  names  now  as  “  familiar  as  house¬ 
hold  words:  ”  Schenck,  Schurz,  Williams  (A.  S.),  Crawford,  Gordon,  Greene  (Geo.  S.),  King, 
Hatch  (J.  P. ) ,  Doubleday,  Patrick,  Gibbon,  Ricketts,  Tower,  Reynolds,  Meade,  Seymour, 
Jackson  (C.  F. ) ,  Kearny,  Robinson  (J.  C. ),  Birney,  Poe,  Joe  Hooker,  Grover,  Morell,  Griffin, 
Butterfield,  Sykes,  Buchanan,  Chapman,  Warren,  Piatt,  Stevens,  and  many  others.  Al¬ 
most  all  of  these  gentlemen,  as  well  as  Pope  and  the  corps  commanders  already  named, 
were  or  had  been  officers  of  the  regular  army,  educated  in  military  science  at  the  United 
States  Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  and  many  of  them  ripe  in  experience  derived  in 
Mexico,  and  in  the  petty  but  harassing  campaigns  against  the  Indians.  Large  numbers  of 
the  officers  of  lesser  rank  were  also  old  regulars,  and  of  the  others  all  were  earnest  and  patri¬ 
otic  citizens  that  the  vicissitudes  of  a  year  of  warfare  had  already  developed  into  efficient 
officers.  Of  the  material  of  the  rank  and  file  it  is  unnecessary  to  speak.  We  all  know  that 
at  that  period  of  the  war  these  men  were  of  the  flower  of  the  Northern  youth.  The  arms, 
the  equipment,  and  all  the  material  of  war  was  as  unlimited  in  quantity  as  it  was  unexcelled 
in  quality,  and  all  that  a  generous,  earnest,  and  wealthy  people  could  give.  History  affords 
no  instance  of  an  army  better  equipped  to  fight  the  battles  of  its  country. 

The  Confederate  forces,  under  the  command  of  General  Lee,  were  divided  into  two 
wings  or  grand  divisions — the  right  wing  commanded  by  Lieutenant  General  James  Long- 
street — the  left  by  Major  General  Thomas  J.  Jackson,  who  won  his  sobriquet  of  “Stone¬ 
wall  ”  on  this  same  field  the  year  previous.  The  artillery  of  the  right  wing  comprised 


6 


21  batteries,  with  Colonel  Stephen  D.  Lee  as  Chief  of  Artillery  ;  that  of  the  left  wing, 
also  21  batteries,  with  Colonel  Stapleton  Crutchfield  Chief  of  Artillery.  The  calvary  corps, 
under  the  famous  J.  E.  B.  Stewart,  consisted  of  the  brigades  of  Fitz  Hugh  Lee  and  Beverly 
H.  Robertson.  Of  these,  and  of  the  division  and  brigade  commanders,  many  of  them 
were  also  ex-officers  of  the  old  regular  army  of  the  United  States,  who,  in  taking  up  arms 
against  their  country,  were  the  antagonists  of  their  old  friends,  classmates,  and  comrades, 
in  a  cause  they  believed  to  be  right.  Their  names — many  of  them — are  as  familiar  to 
us  all,  as  are  those  of  the  Union  Army,  and  held  as  dearly  in  Southern  remembrance  as  are 
those  of  the  Union  roster.  There  was  Evans  and  Hood  and  Law  and  Stevens;  there  was 
Wilcox  (Cadmus)  with  Pryor  and  Featherston  ;  Kemper  and  Corse,  Jenkins  and  Hutton  ; 
Jones  (D.  R.),  Anderson  (G.  T.),  Benning,  and  Drayton ;  R.  H.  Anderson,  Mahone,  Wright, 
and  Armistead.  All  these  of  Longstreet’s  corps.  Of  “Stonewall”  Jackson’s  command 
there  was  Ewell,  Lawton,  Jubal  Early,  Ferno,  Trimble,  Hill  (A.  P.),  Branch,  Gregg,  Field, 
Pender,  Archer,  Thomas,  Starke,  Baylor,  Johnson  (Bradley  T.),  Taliaferro,  Stafford,  and 
many  other  well  known  officers.  Like  the  men  of  the  Union  Army,  the  rank  and  file  of  the 


FIGHTING  OVER  TIIE  FENCE. 


Confederate  forces  were  drawn  from  the  best  material  of  the  South.  Their  terrible  earnest¬ 
ness  made  up  in  a  large  measure  for  many  deficiencies  in  clothing,  camp  equipage  and 
commissariat ;  their  courage  and  endurance  are  known  of  all  men. 

In  order  to  a  clear  understanding  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas,  it  seems  desirable  to  explain 
briefly  the  military  situation  immediately  preceding  this  culmination  of  a  short  and — to  the 
Union  Arms — disastrous  campaign. 


SYKES’  DIVISION  CHARGING  STONEWALL  JACKSON  OVER  THE  RAILROAD  EMBANKMENT. 


7 


General  McClellan  had  already  effected  his  change  of  base,  from  the  Chickahominy  to 
the  Janies  River,  and  it  had  been  decided  in  Washington,  to  unite  the  Armies  of  the 
Potomac  and  of  Virginia,  withdrawing  for  this  purpose  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the 
Peninsula. 

On  the  11th  of  July  General  Halleck  was  appointed  General-in-Chief  of  all  the  armies  of 
the  United  States,  and  soon  afterward  reaching  Washington,  assumed  command.  Orders 
were  issued  to  McClellan  early  in  August  to  withdraw  his  army  from  the  Peninsula  and 
embark  for  Aquia  Creek  on  the  Potomac.  To  prevent  a  concentration  of  Lee’s  army  upon 
McClellan  while  executing  this  manoeuvre  bv  making  such  demonstrations  as  would  ci’eate 
a  diversion  was  the  problem  before  Pope. 

When  Lee  found  McClellan’s  withdrawal  from  the  Peninsula  was  determined,  he  saw 
also  two  courses  open  to  him — to  concentrate  upon  and  give  battle  to  McClellan — and  at 
least  embarass  and  delay  his  embarkation,  or,  disregarding  the  manoeuvres  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  to  mass  his  forces  on  Pope  and  crush  him  before  McClellan  could  unite  with 
him.  This  latter  course  General  Lee  decided  upon,  with  what  lamentable  result  to  us  we  all 
know. 

On  August  13th,  about  the  same  time  McClellan  was  embarking  at  Harrison’s  Landing, 
the  march  of  Longstreet  with  his  corps  of  some  25,000  men  was  directed  upon  the  Rapidan 
near  which,  on  the  9th  of  August,  Banks  had  engaged  Jackson  at  Cedar  Mountain  with  dis- 
asterous  results  to  the  Union  arms. 

The  cavalry  corps  of  the  Confederate  Army,  under  Stuart,  was  directed  upon  Gordons- 
ville.  Pope  now  fell  back  behind  the  Rappahannock,  the  movement  being  completed  by  the 
20th,  maintaining  his  communications  with  Aquia  Creek,  at  which  point  the  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  were  to  disembark.  Reynolds’  division  of  Pennsylvania  Reserves 
was  the  first  of  these  troops  to  arrive  on  the  23d,  when  it  was  attached  to  the  corps  of 
McDowell.  For  several  days  movements  and  counter-movements  were  taking  place — the 
two  armies  silently  preparing  for  the  great  battle  that  evidently  was  impending.  Presently, 
on  the  night  of  the  22d,  Stuart  made  a  dash  with  his  cavalry  around  our  left,  striking  the 
railroad  at  Catlett’s  Station.  This  demonstration  threatening  Pope’s  rear  had  the  usual 
disturbing  result  of  a  cavalry  .raid,  including  the  annoying  capture  of  headquarters  trains 
and  papers. 

Lee  now  determined  upon  another  and  bolder  movement,  and  Jackson  with  his  whole 
corps  moved  out  on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  and  swung  round  our  right  for  the  purpose  of 
cutting  our  railroad  communications  and  capturing  or  destroying  the  great  mass  of  stores 
assembled  at  Manassas  Junction.  It  was  a  dangerous  move  for  the  enemy  since  there  was 
the  chance  of  Jackson  being  crushed  by  Pope  before  Lee  could  send  Longstreet  to  his  aid— 
to  say  nothing  of  the  risk  of  his  running  into  large  bodies  of  McClellan’s  troops  advancing 
from  the  direction  of  Alexandria  and  Falmouth.  These  troops,  some  of  them,  were  already 
en  route  to  the  front  and  some  had  joined.  Heintzelman,  with  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and 
Phil.  Kearny,  had  already  reported  for  duty  with  over  10,000  men;  Fitz  John  Porter’s  two 
divisions  of  the  5th  corps  (Sykes  [the  regulars]  and  Morell)  were  at  Kelley’s  Ford  and 
Bealton  Station;  and  Reynolds,  as  has  been  said,  was  already  up  and  at  Warrenton. 

Buford  was  on  the  right,  near  Waterloo,  with  his  cavalry  ;  Ricketts  was  near  Warren¬ 
ton  ;  King  was  stretched  out  on  the  road  between  Warrenton  and  Sulphur  Springs;  Sigel 
was  in  camp  near  by ;  Banks  was  at  Fayetteville;  and  Heintzelman  was  near  Warrenton 
Junction  where  Pope’s  Headquarters  were.  On  the  night  of  the  26th  the  “  Foot  Cavalry  ” 
of  Stonewall  Jackson  was  at  Bristoe  Station  with  the  divisions  of  Taliaferro,  A.  P.  Hill  and 
Ewell — in  all  some  25,000  men.  Pope  soon  discovered  this  move,  although  its  magnitude 
and  importance  was  not  primarily  apparent.  Having  first  sent  a  regiment  of  Heintzelman ’s 
down  the  railroad  by  cars  to  feel  the  enemy,  the  next  morning  (the  27th)  the  results  of  this 
recon noisance  determined  Pope  to  move  with  his  whole  army  on  Gainesville.  The  move¬ 
ment  at  once’ began.  Hooker  was  sent  in  the  direction  of  Manassas,  “  to  drive  out  the  enemy,” 
and  near  Bristoe  encounted  Ewell’s  division  of  Jackson’s  corps.  Hooker  at  once  attacked, 
and  in  a  sharp  engagement  terminating  only  with  night  fall,  forced  Ewell  back  across  Broad 
Run.  It  was  now  apparent  that  here  was  the  opportunity  to  smash  Jackson  before  Lee 
could  come  to  his  aid — but  the  chance  was  lost.  Jackson,  after  capturing  Manassas  Junction 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Getty  Research  Institute 


https://archive.org/details/comprehensiveskeOOunse 


10 


with  its  immense  quantity  of  military  stores  of  all  sorts  (a  god-send  to  his  ragged  and 
famished,  but  indomitable  soldiery)  destroying  all  he  could  not  carry  off,  deftly  slipped 
through  our  fingers,  and  unopposed,  though  marching  on  three  different  roads,  arrived 
early  on  the  28th,  on  the, old  battle  field  of  Bull  Bun,  and  safely  ensconsed  himself  behind 
and  in  the  cuts  and  fills  of  an  old  unfinished  railroad  where  he  rested — and  “waited  for  the 
hour  and  the  man.” 

Although  the  position  occupied  by  Jackson  was  at  this  time  unknown  to  General  Pope, 
it  was  at  least  certain  that  sufficient  time  had  not  elapsed  for  him  to  have  rejoined  Long- 
street  or  for  that  officer  to  have  united  with  him.  Dispositions  were  at  once  made  by  Pope 
to  accomplish  one  or  all  of  three  possible  things :  1st,  to  intercept  and  retard  the  march  of 
Longstreet ;  2d,  to  destroy  Jackson  ;  and  8d,  to  beat  each  in  detail. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  cavalry  was  sent  to  reconnoitre  toward  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  and  on  their  report  Bickett’s  division  was  detached  to  intercept  Long-street’s  march 
through  the  Gap  toward  Gainesville  on  the  Warrenton  Pike.  This  movement  was  so  effective 
as  not  only  to  delay  but  divert  the  march  of  Longstreet,  so  that  he  was  compelled  to  pass  a  part 
of  his  command  through  Hopewell  Gap  further  north,  and  consequently  did  not  arrive  on  the 
field  until  near  11  o’clock  of  the  29th  when,  accompanied  by  Lee  in  person,  he  rested  .his  left 
on  Jackson’s  right  and  stretched  out  his  line  of  battle  far  to  the  south  of  the  Warrenton  Pike 
and  beyond  our  left.  In  the  meantime,  King’s  division  was  moving  by  the  flank  along  the 
Warrenton  Pike  toward  Centreville.  About  dark,  at  Groveton,  Gibbon’s  brigade  of  this 


CONFEDERATE  OFFICER  URGING  HIS  MEN. 


division,  supported  by  two  regiments  of  Doubleday’s  brigade  of  the  same  division,  engaged 
in  a  fierce  and  sanguinary  conflict  with  Ewell’s  division  of  Jackson’s  corps,  “Stonewall” 
himself  being  present  on  the  field.  This  was  practically  a  drawn  battle,  and  was  useless  in 
its  results,  except  in  developing  the  position  of  the  hitherto  missing  “Stonewall.”  Our  loss 
was  heavy,  as  was  that  of  the  enemy ;  the  position  was  a  critical  one  for  us ;  no  supports 
were  within  reach  ;  and  the  enemy  evidently  outnumbered  King’s  division,  and  possessed 
the  advantage  of  position,  although  the  battle  field  remained  in  our  possession.  It  was  there¬ 
fore  decided  to  withdraw  the  division  near  and  east  of  Mansassas  Junction  for  the  night, 
which  was  done  in  perfect  order. 

The  morning  of  the  29th  opened  with  Reynolds  and  Sigel  near  Groveton,  King  and 
Porter  at  Manassas  Junction,  Bicketts  near  Bristoe,  and  Heintzelman,  with  Hooker  and 
Kearny’s  divisions  near  Centerville.  Jackson  was  still  in  position  on  the  line. of  the  un- 


11 


finished  railroad,  while  Lee  with  Longstreet’s  whole  corps  was  moving  steadily  forward,  from 
Thoroughfare  and  Hopewell  Gaps,  arriving  and  forming,  as  already  described,  by  noon  of 
that  day.  Toward  morning  of  the  29th,  General  Pope  supposing  for  some  reason  that  Jackson 
was  in  retreat,  started  Kearny  and  Hooker  forward  to  attack  his  rear  while  Porter  was 
instructed  to.  move  upon  Centerville.  General  Pope  now  learning  of  the  movements  of  King 
and  Rickets  during  the  night,  ordered  Sigel  to  overtake  Jackson  and  bring  him  to  a  stand. 
Sigel,  delivering  his  attack,  developed  Jackson’s  intrenched  position  from  which  he  had  no.t 
stirred  since  Gibbon’s  tight  with  him  the  night  before.  Porter’s  corps,  of  about  9,000  men, 
had  in  the  meantime  been  countermarched,  and  moving  out  on  the  road  toward  Gainesville 
he  deployed  Morell’s  division  along  the  line  of  Dawkin’s  branch,  where  he  confronted  the 
right  wing  of  Lee’s  army  under  Longstreet,  25,000  strong.  Not  being  at  that  moment  quite 
fully  informed  of  the  enemy’s  movements,  and  being  then  under  orders  from  Pope  to  push 
towards  Gainesville,  with  view  to  cutting  off  and  “bagging  ”  Jackson,  Porter  was  pressing- 
forward  to  attack  the  enemy  in  his  front,  when  General  McDowell,  arrived  on  the  field  at 
Porter’s  headquarters  with  later  information  of  the  enemy,  and  with  later  and  different 


LONGSTREET  S  SKIRMISHERS. 


orders  from  Pope,  assumed  command  of  both  Porter’s  corps  and  his  own  division  (that  of 
King)  and  stopped  Porter’s  advance.  It  was  then  evident  to  both  Porter  and  McDowell 
that  a  strong  force  of  the  enemy  was  in  their  immediate  front,  and  from  a  few  prisoners 
captured  the  fact  was  elicited  that  Longstreet  was  up.  General  McDowell  decided  to  advance 
no  further,  and  leaving  Porter  where  he  was,  confronting  Longstreet,  (who  with  more  than 
double  his  numbers  overlapped  his  flank  with  not  only  his  infantry,  but  with  a  cloud  of 
cavalry  under  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,)  he  took  King’s  division  with  him  back  along  the  Gainesville 
and  Manassass  road,  past  Bethlehem  church,  and  up  the  Sudley  springs  road,  where  these 
troops,  now  under  command  of  General  J.  P.  Hatch,  awaited  events  in  a  field  opposite 
the  Henry  House  until  later  in  the  day. 

General  Pope,  still  in  the  belief  that  there  was  nothing  in  Porter’s  front  and,  believing  also 
that  Porter  at  that  time  to  be  actually  on  the  right  flank  and  partly  in  the  rear  of  Jackson, 
sent  him  an  order  dated  4.30  p.  m.  directing  him  to  attack  Jackson’s  right  flank  and  rear. 
Fortunately  that  order  did  not  reach  Porter  until  about  sunset,  too  late  to  complete  arrange¬ 
ments  for  attack  before  dark.  The  results  go  to  show  that  Porter’s  presence  in  Longstreet’s 
front,  during  that  day  and  night,  deferred  until  the  next  day  (the  30th  when  be  was  with- 


12 


drawn)  the  defeat  of  the  Union  army  that  resulted  when  Lee’s  right  wing,  under  Longstreet, 
was  then  swung  forward  in  a  grand  left  wheel  toward  the  Pike. 

The  veterans  of  Heintzleman,  under  Kearny  and  Hooker,  early  in  the  morning  of  the 
29th,  crossed  Bull  Run,  pi-essed  forward  to  the  front,  and  deployed  opposed  to  Jxickson’s 
left  near  Sudley  Springs.  About  3  p.  m.,  under  Pope’s  orders,  Hooker  and,  later,  Kearny 
delivered  a  gallant  attack,  which  was  unsupported  ;  and  though  attended  with  severe  losses  on 
both  sides,  left  Jackson  unshaken.  Thei-e  was  no  general  engagement  during  the  29th  of  Au¬ 
gust.  The  battle  of  that  day  consisted  only  of  a  number  of  sharp  and  gallant  combats.  These 
were  of  short  duration,  and  were  separated  by  long  intervals  of  simple  skirmishing  and 
artillery  duels.  Only  a  small  part  of  the  troops  on  either  side  were  engaged  at  any  one  time. 
The  attacks  of  both  Hooker  and  Kearny  were  conspicuously  gallant,  and  had  they  been 


f 

C'' 


GENERAL  LEE  AND  STAFF. 


simultaneous  and  properly  supported  must  have  resulted  in  breaking  Jackson  in  twain.  Gro¬ 
ver’s  brigade  led  the  attack  in  the  most  handsome  manner.  He  charged  and  carried  the  railroad 
embankment,  and  in  an  actual  hand-to-hand  conflict  with  the  bayonet  and  the  butt  of  the 
musket,  drove  the  enemy  some  distance.  But  both  Grover  and  Kearny  were  compelled  to 
retire  befoi-e  overwhelming  numbers.  Then  about  sunset,  Pope  still  under  the  mistaken  impres¬ 
sion  that  there  were  no  troops  in  his  front  except  those  of  Jackson,  and  that  he  was  in  “  full 
l-etreat,”  directed  McDowell  to  “  pursue  him  and  give  him  battle.”  King’s  division  (Hatch 
commanding)  was  designated  for  this  duty,  and  promptly  pushed  along  the  pike  to  Groveton. 
Hearing  this  village  deployments  were  made  and  our  skirmishers  soon  encountered  those  of 
the  enemy.  A  well-sustained  and  rapidly-increasing  musketry  lire  from  an  unyielding  line, 
together  with  a  vigorous  cannonade  on  his  part,  soon  convinced  General  Hatch  that  the 
enemy,  far  from  being  “in  retreat”  was  strongly  posted,  and  determinedly  resisting  the 
Union  advance.  Presently,  in  the  darkness  the  enemy  advanced  both  his  flanks,  and  finally 
with  a  charge  delivered  from  his  left,  compelled  Hatch  to  retire  with  considerable  loss  in 
hilled,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  and  one  gun.  It  was  a  gallant  fight,  but  fruitless  and  useless 
to  the  Union  arms.  The  enemy  encountered  was  Hood’s  division  of  Longstreet’s  corps, 
supported  by  the  division  of  Cadmus  Wilcox. 


18 


This  ended  the  contest  for  the  night  all  along  the  lines  ;  both  sides  rectified  their  positions 
and  slept  on  their  arms,  preparatory  to  the  eventful  day  to  come,  that  for  so  many  gallant 
souls  was  to  be  their  last  on  earth. 

The  morning  of  the  30th  of  August,  1862,  broke  clear  and  bright.  The  beautiful  hills 
and  dales,  the  forests  and  streams  of  Prince  William  county  were  destined  to  he  the  scene  of 
a  terrible  conflict,  the  details  of  which  cannot  be  recalled,  even  at  this  late  day,  without 
emotion.  At  an  early  hour  Pope  ordered  a  reconnaissance  made  in  his  front.  The  enemy, 
in  readjusting  his  lines  during  the  night,  had  made  various  unimportant  changes  in  position 
that  persuaded  General  Pope  he  was  in  retreat.  The  Union  army  was  now  all  north  of  the 
pike  facing  west,  Fitz  John  Porter  having,  by  General  Pope’s  order,  been  withdrawn  from 
his  position  on  the  left  confronting  Longstreet  and  put  in  at  sunrise  on  the  right  of  the  pike. 
One  division  alone,  that  of  Reynolds,  was  on  the  left  (or  south)  of  the  turnpike.  The  rest  of 
the  Army  stretched  off  northward  toward  Sudlev  Springs  in  the  following  order:  First, 
Porter,  then  Reno,  and  then  Heintzelman,  Ricketts  and  King  (Hatch)  being  in  reserve. 


longstreet’s  artillery. 

Elevated  ground  immediately  in  front  and  to  the  left  of  Reynolds  was  covered  with  dense 
timber.  A  narrow  but  dense  forest  was  also  on  Porter’s  right  and  extending  for  a  long  dis¬ 
tance  in  front  of  Reno  and  Heintzelman.  Between  the  forests  and  skirting  the  Warrenton 
pike  was  cleared  ground  and  a  ravine,  through  which  flows  the  insignificant  stream  called 
Hogan’s  branch,  emptying  into  Young’s  branch,  while  beyond  a  natural  glacis  rises  rapidly 
to  an  elevated  ridge,  along  which  runs  the  unfinished  railroad,  behind  which  cover  Jackson 
still  lurked,  hidden  and  ready  for  attack.  The  heights  on  Jackson’s  right  and  between  that 
and  the  still  more  closely-hidden  Longstreet’s  left  were  crowned  with  numerous  artillery, 
commanding  all  approaches  with  both  direct  and  enfilade  hre.  Away  ofl  to  our  left,  buried 
out  of  our  sight  in  the  forest  depths,  stretched  for  a  distance  of  over  two  miles  Longstreet’s 
immense  force,  where  it  had  been  since  noon  of  the  day  before  (the  29th).  Nevertheless,  at 
noon  of  the  30th  the  commanding  general  of  the  Union  forces  was  still  of  the  opinion  the 
Confederate  army  was  in  full  retreat;  so  much  so  that  he  issued  the  following  order: 


14 


“  HEADQUARTERS,  NEAR  GruVKTON, 

“August  80,  1862.  12  m. 


“  Special  Order. 


“  The  following  forces  will  be  immediately  thrown  forward  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and 
press  him  vigorously  during  the  whole  day.  Major-General  McDowell  is  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  pursuit.  Major-General  Porter’s  corps  will  push  forward  on  the  Warrenton 
turnpike,  followed  by  the  divisions  of  Brigadier-Generals  King  and  lleynolds. 

“The  division  of  Brig.  Genl.  Ricketts  will  pursue  the  Haymarket  road,  followed  by 
the  corps  of  Maj.  Genl.  Heintzelman.  The  necessary  cavalry  will  be  assigned  to  these  col¬ 
umns  by  Maj.  Gen.  McDowell,  to  whom  regular  and  frequent  reports  will  be  made.. 

“  The  general  headquarters  will  be  somewhere  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike. 

“By  command  of  Maj.  Genl.  Pope. 


“Geo.  D.  Ruqgt.es, 

‘ 1  Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff.  ’  ’ 


In  compliance  with  this  General  McDowell  sent  orders  to  Porter  to  “  organize  a  strong 
advance  to  precede  your  command  and  push  on  rapidly  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  until  you 
come  in  contact  with  him.”  Bayard’s  cavalry  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  Porter,  who 
was  instructed  to  push  it  well  to  the  left.  King’s  division  (Hatch  commanding),  supported 
by  Reynolds,  was  ordered  to  follow  Porter,  while  Heintzelman  with  his  corps,  preceded  by 
Ricketts’  division,  was  to  move  on  the  road  from  Sudley  Springs  to  Haymarket,  skirmishers 
being  thrown  out  all  along  the  line.  Previously  to  the  receipt  of  this  order  General  Porter 
and  General  Reynolds  had  sent  out  skirmishers  in  their  fronts,  and  both  ascertained  the  fact 
that  the  enemy  was  strongly  posted,  Reynolds’  flank  being  threatened  by  a  turning  movement. 
This  was  reported  to  General  Pope,  but  that  officer,  believing  that  Jackson  was  retiring  to 
unite  with  Longstreet,  at  2.30  p.  m.  directed  Porter,  with  Hatch  in  support,  to  move  forward 
and  attack.  Accordingly  General  Porter  made  his  dispositions,  sending  forward  two  brigades 
of  Morrell’s  under  General  Daniel  Butterfield,  and  two  brigades  of  Sykes’  regulars  under 
Buchanan  and  Chapman  to  develope  the  enemy,  holding  the  remainder  of  Sykes’  division 
in  supporting  distance.  At  the  same  time  he  ordered  Hatch  to  deploy  his  division  on 
Sykes’  right  in  four  lines.  Bayard’s  cavalry  was  useless  if  sent  forward,  and  lie  was 
directed  to  deploy  in  his  rear  and  arrest  stragglers.  While  these  preparations  were  making 
the  order  for  the  pursuit  was  issued,  and  Porter  pressed  forward  to  the  attack,  and 
gallantly  charged  Jackson’s  intrenched  lines.  The  murderous  enfilading  artillery  fire, 
together  with  the  furious  direct  infantry  fire,  swept  away  rank  after  rank  of  the  gallant 
Union  troops  as  each  was  about  to  crown  the  embankment.  The  fighting  was,  much  of  it, 
hand  to  hand,  many  being  killed  and  wounded  by  stones  and  clubbed  muskets.  Four  times 
the  Federal  troops  stormed  the  embankment,  and  as  many  times  were  repulsed,  inflicting  and 
receiving  extremely  severe  losses.  While  this  fighting  was  in  progress  on  our  left  the  right 
of  our  line,  under  Ricketts,  Reno,  Kearny,  Hooker,  and  Heintzelman,  was  also  hotly  engaged, 
suffering  heavy  losses.  These  officers  continued  the  struggle  until  nearly  nightfall,  when,  on 
the  falling  back  of  the  troops  of  Porter  and  Hatch  on  the  left,  those  on  the  right  were,  by 
General  Pope’s  order,  retired  also  in  the  direction  of  Centreville.  During  this  time  Sigel 
was  held  in  reserve  behind  Porter,  and  Reynolds  was  withdrawn  from  his  commanding  posi¬ 
tion  south  of  the  pike,  where  he  was  holding  the  enemy  in  check,  and  put  in  position  on  the 
turnpike  in  rear  of  Porter.  This  move  was  an  unfortunate  one,  entirely  uncovering  the  left 
flank  of  the  Union  troops.  Colonel  (afterward  the  famous  Major  General)  G.  K.  Warren, 
ever  prompt  to  remedy  errors  and  to  take  advantage  of  positions,  seeing  the  key  to  our  whole 
line  thus  vacated  by  the  removal  of  Reynolds,  without  waiting  for  orders,  but  with  Sykes’ 
approval,  threw  his  small  brigade  into  the  gap,  where,  after  sustaining  a  destructive  artillery 
fire  and  losing  very  heavily,  he  stemmed  the  tide  of  Confederate  advance  until  compelled  by 
overwhelming  numbers  to  withdraw.  Further  attack  on  Jackson  was  now  evidently  useless, 
for  Longstreet  was  turning  our  left  with  his  powerful  force,  and  the  possession  of  the  turnpike 
became  at  once  the  point  at  issue.  Longstreet’s  command  comprised  the  divisions  of  Hood, 
Kemper,  D.  R.  Jones,  and  Wilcox,  besides  artillery  and  cavalry.  These  troops  were  pushed 
steadily  forward,  and  were  as  steadily  and  gallantly  met  by  the  Union  forces.  Two  principal 
heights,  Bald  Hill  (better  known  as  Chinn  House)  and  Henry  Hill,  were  occupied,  and 
troops  were  hurried  there  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Sigel ’s  corps  had  up  to  this  time  been  in 


15 


reserve  and  was  comparatively  fresh,  and  he  was  sent  to  Bald  Hill,  together  with  two 
brigades  of  Ricketts’  division  under  General  Tower  and  several  batteries  of  artillery.  Por¬ 
ter,  with  the  men  of  his  corps  available  after  his  heavy  losses  in  front  of  Jackson,  went 
to  Henry  Hill,  as  did  also  the  brigades  of  Meade  and  Seymour  of  Reynolds’  division,  with 
Graham’s  battery  and  a  part  of  Reno’s  command  and  Tower’s  brigade  of  Ricketts’  division. 
North  of  the  pike  the  rest  of  Reno’s  corps,  with  Heintzelman,  disputed  the  advance  of  Jack- 
son,  who  had  begun  a  general  forward  movement  all  along  his  line  simultaneously  with  that 
of  Longstreet. 

The  fighting  at  Bald  Hill  was  severe  in  the  extreme.  McLean’s  brigade  of  Schenck’s 
division  of  Sigel’s  corps  received  and  repulsed  several  furious  attacks  with  great  gallantry. 
Stahl  and  Schurz  also,  with  their  brigades  and  those  of  Koltes  and  Kryzanowski,  went  in 
here  and  behaved  handsomely.  The  losses  were  heavy  on  both  sides.  Schenck  was  severely 
wounded,  as  was  also  General  Tower.  Colonel  Koltes  and  Colonel  Fletcher  Webster  (son  of 
the  great  Daniel  Webster)  were  killed.  The  Confederates  also  lost  heavily  in  officers  as  well 
as  men.  Notwithstanding  the  heroic  resistance  of  our  brave  troops  the  enemy  carried  this 
position  by  sheer  force  of  numbers. 


But  Henry  Hill  still  remained  to  us,  and  the  safety  of  General  Pope’s  command  demanded 
a  determined  stand  should  be  made  here,  and  the  position  held  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the 
army.  As  already  stated  Henry  Hill  was  now  occupied  by  the  remnants  of  the  corps  of  Fitz 
John  Porter  with  parts  of  the  commands  of  Reynolds  and  Reno.  With  stern  bravery,  sup¬ 
ported  in  their  hearts  by  a  valor  born  of  true  patriotism,  the  Union  soldiery  received  the 
shock  of  battle  without  quailing.  The  heights  were  held,  though  the  losses  were  terrible. 
Gradually  our  army  withdrew  behind  Bull  Run  and  toward  Centreville — the  Confederate 
advance  terminated — and  the  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run  was  over. 

The  stubborn,  persistent  fighting  on  both  sides  on  this  as  on  all  occasions  was  distinctively 
American.  The  Union  army,  beaten  but  undismayed,  only  two  weeks  later,  under  another 
leader,  on  the  14th  and  17th  of  September,  at  South  Mountain  and  Antietam,  met,  fought, 
and  beat  the  same  Confederate  army  that  had  beaten  it  a  fortnight  before.  The  strife  is  long 
since  ended  ;  the  war  is  long  since  over  ;  and  while  we  of  either  side  in  the  fight  look,  in 
company,  upon  this  noble  picture  that  thrillingly  depicts  the  bitterness  of  that  awful  day, 
we  can  surely  afford  to  mutually  remember  that  now  we  are  all  Americans  with  but  one 
country  and  one  Hag,  and  can  truthfully  and  graphically  speak  of  each  other  as  “our  friends, 
the  enemy.” 


WHAT  THE  PANORAMA  SHOWS. 


Standing  upon  the  platform  and  looking  east  we  see  the  town  of  Centreville  in  the  distance 
directly  over  the  school-house  on  the  Sudley  and  Groveton  road.  A  little  further  to  the  right 
is  the  Henry  house,  where  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run  was  mainly  fought,  and  where  the  final 
stand  was  made  by  us  at  the  second  battle.  Still  further  to  the  right  and  nearer  us  is  the 
Dogan  house  and  peach  orchard.  On  the  left  of  the  large  tree  in  the  foreground,  under  which 
is  seen  a  wounded  Union  officer,  is  the  Chinn  house  on  Bald  Hill,  and  to  the  right  of  the  tree 
is  the  village  of  Groveton,  at  the  junction  of  the  Groveton  and  Sudley  road  with  the  War- 
renton  pike.  The  dense  forests  beyond  the  turnpike  are  those  that  hid  from  view  the 
powerful  corps  of  Longstreet.  To  the  westward  is  seen  the  Bull  Run  range  of  mountains, 
the  deep  notch  being  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Still  turning  to  the  right  we  sec  before  us  more 
forest  and  a  stretch  of  parapet  that  is  part  of  an  unfinished  railroad  which  Stonewall  Jackson 
occupied  from  here  to  Sudley  Springs  with  his  troops. 


<f. 

THE  DUEL. 


The  point  occupied  by  tin;  platform  from  which  we  look  out  upon  this  charming  land¬ 
scape  is  on  “  Douglas  Heights,”  directly  opposite  Jackson’s  right.  That  officer  and  his  staff 
are  seen  in  the  field  directly  in  rear  of  the  railroad  cut  occupied  by  his  men.  The  Union 
troops  represented  making  the  tremendous  and  gallant  charge  on  Jackson’s  entrenched  lines 
are  some  of  Sykes’  regulars,  the  brigades  of  Chapman  and  Buchanan.  The  officer  on  the 
bay  horse  with  his  sabre  raised  is  Colonel  Chapman  ;  the  officer  nearest  him  is  Major  Lovell. 
Captain  Collins,  with  his  sword  raised,  is  leading  the  battalion  immediately  in  rear  of  the 
colors,  with  Captain  Powell  on  his  right.  The  officer  who  is  being  dragged  by  the  stirrup  is 


17 


a  staff  officer  who  lias  been  wounded  while  hearing  orders.  Captain  David  McKibben,  com- 
manding  one  of  the  regular  regiments,  is  seen  coining  up  on  a  gray  horse,  his  first  horse,  a 
bay  one  in  the  foreground,  having  been  killed.  In  the  field  just  beyond  is  seen  part  of 
Buchanan’s  brigade,  led  by  that  veteran  officer. 

Still  further  off  is  King’s  division,  under  Hatch,  going  into  action,  while  near  by  is 
General  Porter  and  staff  directing  the  movement.  Batteries  of  our  artillery  are  scattered 
along  as  far  as  the  Dogan  house,  Avhile  in  the  open  ground  beyond  are  the  reserves  under 
Sigel  and  Reynolds.  Warren’s  brigade  can  be  seen  in  position  in  the  fields  beyond  the  peach 
grove,  while  some  few  of  our  skirmishers  are  deploying  in  the  open  ground  in  front  of  the 
village  of  Groveton.  From  the  woods  in  their  front  have  just  emerged  a  few  troops  of  the 
left  of  Hood’s  and  Wilcox’s  divisions  of  the  Confederates.  General  Hood  and  his  staff  are 
shown  on  their  left.  In  the  foreground  are  skirmishers  of  Porter  and  Wilcox  engaged  at 
close  quarters,  while  in  the  distance  and  inrear  of  the  latter  is  the  left  of  Wilcox’s  division. 
Immediately  in  his  front  is  the  artillery  of  the  Confederates,  some  of  it  in  battery  and  some 
coming  up  at  a  gallop.  Close  by  us  is  General  Lee  and  staff.  That  officer  is  mounted  on  a 
gray  horse  and  is  engaged  in  conversation  with  General  Longstreet.  General  Wilcox  is  on 
the  opposite  side  of  General  Lee.  The  three  officers  behind  General  Lee  are  his  personal 
aides-de-camp — Colonel  Long,  in  the  red  cap,  Colonel  Venable,  and  Colonel  Marshall.  The 
other  officer  in  the  red  cap  is  Colonel  Crutchfield,  chief  of  artillery  to  General  Jackson. 
Colonel  Stephen  D.  Lee,  on  the  dun  horse,  is  Longstreet’s  chief  of  artillery.  In  rear  of  Lee 
and  staff  is  seen  a  field  hospital  and  beyond  a  body  of  Confederate  cavalry. 

All  through  the  picture  will  be  found  very  many  figures  and  groups  that  are  in  them¬ 
selves  pictures.  Some  are  painted  on  the  canvas,  some  are  part  of  the  artificial  foreground, 
and  some  are  a  combination  of  both.  The  whole  is  truthful  and  realistic  and  artistic  in  the 
highest  degree,  representing  in  the  best  possible  manner  a  momentous  page  in  the  history  of 
our  common  country. 


2 


20 


% 


0 


SYKES’  DIVISION  CHARGING  STONEWALL  JACKSON  OVER  THE  RAILROAD  EMBANKMENT. 


